Verified Security of BLT Signature Scheme
The majority of real-world applications of digital signatures use timestamping to ensure non-repudiation in face of possible key revocations. This observation led Buldas, Laanoja, and Truu to a server-assisted digital signature scheme built around cryptographic timestamping. In this paper, we report on the machine-checked proofs of existential unforgeability under the chosen-message attack (EUF-CMA) of some variations of BLT digital signature scheme. The proofs are developed and verified using the EasyCrypt framework, which provides interactive theorem proving supported by the state-of-the-art SMT solvers.
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|Formalising Oblivious Transfer in the Semi-Honest and Malicious Model in CryptHOL|
David ButlerAlan Turing Institute, David AspinallUniversity of Edinburgh, Adria GasconAlan Turing InstituteDOI Pre-print Media Attached
|Verified Security of BLT Signature Scheme|
Denis FirsovGuardtime AS, Ahto BuldasTallinn University of Technology, Ahto TruuGuardtime AS, Risto LaanojaGuardtime ASDOI Pre-print Media Attached File Attached